Identifiers

Prompt

Please provide any corrections to: Identifiers When we want to talk about something—whether it’s a person, a document, or a dataset—we need a way to refer to it. That’s where identifiers come in. Identifiers are like names. They’re how we point to something, label it, and keep track of it in both the physical and digital worlds. There are two basic types of identifiers: assigned identifiers and derived identifiers. Assigned identifiers are given by an authority. Think of something like a student ID number, a passport number, or a product serial code. These are handed out by whoever governs the thing being identified. The university gives you a student ID. The government gives you a passport number. You name your report final-final-version-2-submitted.pdf. Derived identifiers, on the other hand, are calculated directly from the thing being identified. In the digital world, a common kind of derived identifier is a digest—a unique fingerprint of a file or piece of data, created using a hashing algorithm. Because the digest is based on the actual content, it changes if the content changes. That makes it useful not just as an identifier, but also for detecting tampering. So why does this matter? Derived identifiers are especially powerful in digital systems where you want to verify integrity. When you are directed to a specific file or chunk of data which is identified with its digest, you can recalculate the digest yourself. If it matches, you know the file or data is authentic. If it doesn’t, something’s changed. That’s a level of trust you can verify with math—no need to ask an authority. Both types of identifiers play important roles in how we organize, reference, and verify things in the digital world. Whether assigned or derived, identifiers are the foundation of everything from databases to identity systems.

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your explanation is quite comprehensive, but here are a few minor corrections and clarifications to enhance accuracy:

1. Assigned Identifiers: Your examples are spot on, but the phrase "You name your report final-final-version-2-submitted.pdf" might be a bit misleading. This is more of a file naming convention rather than an assigned identifier by an authority. Assigned identifiers are typically issued by a governing body or system.

2. Derived Identifiers: The explanation is clear, but it might be helpful to mention that derived identifiers, such as cryptographic digests, are often used in decentralized systems to ensure data integrity and authenticity without relying on a central authority.

3. Verification and Integrity: You correctly highlight the importance of derived identifiers in verifying data integrity. It might be worth noting that this process is a key feature of decentralized identity systems, where trust is established through cryptographic proofs rather than centralized control.

4. Role in Digital Systems: Your conclusion is accurate, emphasizing the foundational role of identifiers. You might also mention that in decentralized identity systems, identifiers can be self-certifying, meaning they are inherently tied to the cryptographic keys that control them, further enhancing security and trust.

Overall, your explanation is well-structured and informative. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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Self certifying identifiers

Promtp

Please provide any corrections to: Self certifying identifiers We use identifiers all the time—your phone number, your passport number, your email address. These are assigned identifiers. Someone—usually an authority—gives them to you. And if someone wants to check whether they're valid, they usually have to ask that authority. But not all identifiers work that way. Some identifiers are derived. That means they’re calculated directly from the thing they identify. In the digital world, this often means taking a file or a piece of content and running it through a cryptographic hash function. The result is a digest—a short, unique fingerprint of that content. Change even one character, and the digest changes completely. These are called content-addressed identifiers. Now, let’s add another layer: cryptographic trust. On the internet, trust is often established using a pair of keys—one private, one public. A private key is used to sign something. A public key is used to verify it. If you want to check who signed something, you look up their public key and use it to verify a signature. And how do you look up that key? One common way is through a Decentralized Identifier, or DID. A DID is the identifier to a resolved DID document which holds or links important information—like the public keys associated with that identity. Now here’s where it gets interesting. If we combine these ideas—derived identifiers, DIDs, and cryptographic keys—we get something called a self-certifying identifier. This is a special kind of identifier that proves it belongs to a specific entity—without needing an authority. How? Take the first entry of a DID document, its genesis, which includes the controller’s public key. Now calculate a digest of that document. That digest becomes part of the DID itself. Because the digest includes the public key, you can’t change the key without changing the identifier. If someone tries to claim that DID using a different key, the digest won’t match—and everyone will know. In other words, the identifier certifies itself. It’s tied to the cryptographic material at its core, and that makes it secure, verifiable, and tamper-evident—just the kind of identifier we need in a decentralized world.

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your explanation of self-certifying identifiers is quite detailed and mostly accurate. Here are a few corrections and clarifications to enhance clarity and precision:

1. Assigned Identifiers: Your examples of assigned identifiers are correct. However, it's important to note that these identifiers are typically managed by a central authority, which is responsible for their issuance and validation.

2. Derived Identifiers: You accurately describe derived identifiers and content-addressed identifiers. However, it's worth noting that not all derived identifiers are content-addressed. Derived identifiers can also include self-certifying identifiers, which are derived from cryptographic keys.

3. Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs): Your explanation of DIDs is mostly correct. However, the DID itself is not the identifier to a resolved DID document; rather, it is the identifier that can be used to resolve a DID document. The DID document contains information such as public keys and service endpoints.

4. Self-Certifying Identifiers: Your description of self-certifying identifiers is accurate. However, the process of creating a self-certifying identifier typically involves deriving the identifier directly from the public key or a fingerprint of the public key, rather than from a digest of the entire DID document. This ensures that the identifier is cryptographically bound to the key material.

5. Verification and Security: You correctly highlight the security and verifiability of self-certifying identifiers. These identifiers are indeed tamper-evident and do not rely on a central authority for validation, making them well-suited for decentralized systems.

Overall, your explanation captures the essence of self-certifying identifiers and their role in decentralized identity systems. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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Where DID Documents Live: Models of Data Storage

Promtp

Please provide any corrections to: Where DID Documents Live: Models of Data Storage When we talk about DIDs, or Decentralized Identifiers, we're really talking about two parts: the identifier itself, the DID, and the DID Document—a standard file that describes the DID associated public keys, authentication methods, and service endpoints. But here’s the key question: Where is that DID document data actually stored? Well, that depends on the DID method, and different methods use different storage models. Let’s look at a few: First, some DID methods store the DID document data directly on a blockchain. This gives you strong immutability and public verification—great for high-trust environments. Examples include did:indy and did:sov. Other methods, like did:ipfs, use content-addressable storage. The document’s address is based on its contents—so if the data changes, the address changes too. That makes it tamper-evident by design. For ease of use, there’s also web-hosted DIDs like did:web. These live on a server, often at a well-known URL. It’s easy to publish, but relies on control of the website—so it’s less secure. Some newer approaches, like did:keri, skip static documents altogether. Instead, they store a verifiable event log. That log keeps track of all key updates and changes over time, making it highly resilient and transparent. And then there are peer DIDs and key-based DIDs. These don’t live on any global network at all. Instead, the data is shared directly between parties, or even derived entirely from a key. They’re lightweight, private, and great for secure, limited-scope interactions. No matter the method, and no matter how the DID data is stored, when you use a DID and resolve the associated DID document, the output is the same: a standard DID Document following the W3C standard. But how you get that document—and how the underlying data is stored—depends entirely on the method behind the DID. In the world of decentralized identity, one output format, many storage models is what keeps things flexible, secure, and interoperable.

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your explanation of where DID Documents live and the models of data storage is quite comprehensive. Here are a few corrections and clarifications to enhance accuracy:

1. DID Document Description: You correctly describe the DID Document as containing public keys, authentication methods, and service endpoints. It's also worth noting that DID Documents can include other metadata relevant to the DID.

2. Blockchain Storage: Your mention of DID methods like did:indy and did:sov storing DID documents on a blockchain is accurate. This approach provides immutability and public verification, which is beneficial for high-trust environments.

3. Content-Addressable Storage: The explanation of did:ipfs using content-addressable storage is correct. This method ensures that any change in the document results in a change in its address, making it tamper-evident.

4. Web-Hosted DIDs: Your description of did:web is accurate. While it offers ease of use, it does rely on the security and control of the hosting website, which can be a limitation in terms of decentralization.

5. Verifiable Event Log: The explanation of did:keri using a verifiable event log instead of static documents is correct. This approach provides a transparent history of key events and changes, enhancing resilience and transparency.

6. Peer and Key-Based DIDs: Your description of peer DIDs and key-based DIDs is accurate. These methods focus on direct data sharing between parties or deriving identifiers from keys, offering privacy and lightweight interactions.

7. Standard Output: You correctly state that regardless of the storage method, resolving a DID results in a standard DID Document as per the W3C standard. This ensures interoperability across different DID methods.

Overall, your explanation captures the diversity of storage models for DID Documents and their implications for decentralized identity. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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Resolving a DID Identifier to a DID Document

Promtp

Please provide any corrections to: Resolving a DID Identifier to a DID Document A Decentralized Identifier, or DID, is a unique string that can be resolved into a DID document—a JSON-based structure that describes the identity it represents. This document typically contains public keys, service endpoints, and other metadata used to enable secure, verifiable interactions. But the way a DID is resolved depends on the method it uses. Let’s look at how different categories of DID methods handle resolution. Some DID methods rely on existing internet infrastructure, such as the Domain Name System (DNS). A common example is did:web. In this approach, the DID string encodes a domain name, and the DID document is retrieved over HTTPS from a well-known location on the web. This method is straightforward and leverages existing authentication mechanisms like TLS, but it depends on the continued availability and security of the domain’s web server. Other methods anchor data to a specific blockchain or distributed ledger. These DIDs resolve by querying that ledger and reconstructing the DID document from a series of recorded operations. Examples include DIDs registered on purpose-built identity networks like Indy or on permissioned infrastructures such as those used in government-backed ecosystems. The resolution process involves retrieving cryptographically signed updates and proofs that attest to the integrity and history of the DID document. These methods offer strong tamper resistance, but often require network access and more processing to verify state changes over time. In contrast, did:key uses a self-contained model. The DID itself includes the public key material, allowing the entire DID document to be constructed locally without querying a remote server or ledger. This makes it ideal for offline use, ephemeral identities, or constrained environments, though it lacks support for rotation, service discovery, or document updates. did:peer takes a peer-to-peer approach. These DIDs are designed for private, pairwise interactions and are not globally resolvable. Instead, the DID document is directly exchanged between parties during connection establishment. This method maximizes privacy and avoids reliance on global infrastructure, but it requires secure and trusted communication at the time of exchange. Some DID methods combine these strategies. For instance, others may publish a hash of the DID document to a public blockchain, rather than storing the full document on-chain. This approach offers tamper-evidence without bloating the ledger, while enabling off-chain storage and resolution. Each of these DID resolution models reflects different priorities: whether it’s decentralization, discoverability, privacy, performance, or compliance. Understanding how a DID resolves to its document is a foundational part of establishing trust in decentralized identity systems.

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your explanation of resolving a Decentralized Identifier (DID) to a DID Document is quite detailed and mostly accurate. Here are a few corrections and clarifications to enhance clarity and precision:

1. DID Document Description: You correctly describe the DID Document as a JSON-based structure containing public keys, service endpoints, and other metadata. This document is essential for enabling secure and verifiable interactions.

2. did:web Resolution: Your explanation of did:web leveraging existing internet infrastructure like DNS is accurate. It uses HTTPS to retrieve the DID Document from a well-known location, which is straightforward but relies on the security and availability of the domain's web server.

3. Blockchain-Based Resolution: You accurately describe how some DID methods use blockchains or distributed ledgers to resolve DIDs. This involves querying the ledger and reconstructing the DID Document from recorded operations, providing strong tamper resistance.

4. did:key Model: Your description of did:key is correct. It is a self-contained model where the DID includes the public key material, allowing local construction of the DID Document. However, as you noted, it lacks support for key rotation, service discovery, or updates.

5. did:peer Approach: You accurately describe did:peer as a method for private, pairwise interactions. The DID Document is exchanged directly between parties, maximizing privacy but requiring secure communication during the exchange.

6. Hybrid Strategies: Your mention of hybrid strategies, such as publishing a hash of the DID Document to a blockchain, is correct. This approach provides tamper-evidence while allowing off-chain storage and resolution.

7. Resolution Priorities: You correctly highlight that different DID resolution models reflect various priorities, such as decentralization, privacy, and performance. Understanding these models is crucial for establishing trust in decentralized identity systems.

Overall, your explanation captures the nuances of DID resolution and the different methods used to achieve it. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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How Long Do DIDs Last?

Promtp

Do you know how long do DIDs last?

Response

I don’t know the exact duration for which Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) last, as it can vary depending on several factors. Generally, the lifespan of a DID is not inherently limited by the technology itself but rather by the context in which it is used and the policies of the DID method employed.

1. Indefinite Lifespan: In many cases, DIDs can last indefinitely as long as the underlying infrastructure (such as a blockchain or distributed ledger) remains operational and the associated cryptographic keys are managed properly.

2. Key Management: The longevity of a DID is often tied to the management of its cryptographic keys. If keys are rotated or compromised, the DID Document may need to be updated to reflect these changes.

3. Method-Specific Policies: Some DID methods may have specific policies or mechanisms that affect the lifespan of a DID. For example, a DID might be deactivated or revoked under certain conditions, such as the expiration of a service agreement or the closure of an associated account.

4. Use Case Requirements: The intended use case for a DID can also influence its lifespan. For instance, DIDs used for temporary or ephemeral interactions may be designed to last only for the duration of a session or transaction.

Ultimately, the duration for which a DID remains valid and usable depends on the governance and operational practices of the DID method and the specific requirements of the use case. If you have more specific details or context, I might be able to provide further insights!

 
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Detecting DID document duplicity

Prompt Please provide any corrections to the following: Detecting DID document duplicity A decentralized identifier, or DID, is a unique string that resolves to a DID document. This document holds important information, including the public keys associated with that identity. But like many digital technologies, DIDs come with certain risks, and different DID methods have emerged to help manage them. One risk is that the owner of a DID document can change the public keys listed in it - also known as forking the DID document. For example, someone might publish a key in their DID document and use it to sign digital statements. Later, they could edit their DID document, switching keys, and then claim those earlier statements weren’t theirs. Technically, the document itself would still be valid, with all the required digital signatures in place, making the change difficult to detect by looking at the DID document alone. That’s why it’s important to observe DID document changes from the outside. There are a few ways to do this. One approach is to store the DID document in a public, tamper-resistant location. DID methods like DID:indy and DID:ipfs use this strategy—DID:indy, for example, uses a blockchain to preserve a transparent and verifiable history. But not all systems rely on public storage. DID:keri takes a different approach. It uses a network of observers, known as watchers. These watchers sign records when they see a DID document and keep copies of relevant sections of the DID document. They verify that the history of changes remains consistent over time. This decentralized, peer-based model allows duplicity to be caught - in a blockchain the watchers can be anyone with access to view the blockchain, while in KERI the watchers are watchers selected for each DID. A different approach used by some DID methods is to post a hash of the DID document content to a public ledger, such as Ethereum. Instead of storing the entire DID document, only a cryptographic fingerprint of the content is recorded. This hash acts as a tamper-evident seal—if someone tries to change the content of the DID document, the hash will no longer match. Verifiers can use this to ensure that the DID document they’re viewing is exactly the one that was originally anchored to the blockchain. Having a way to observe changes to a DID document from the outside by disinterested parties who will not collude to enable DID document duplicity is essential for maintaining trust in decentralized identity systems. Since the DID controller can update the document, independent verification—whether through public ledgers, hash commitments, watcher networks, or other methods—helps ensure that changes are transparent and detectable. Without this external observability, malicious actors could alter their identity records without accountability, undermining the integrity of the system.

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your explanation of detecting DID document duplicity is quite detailed and mostly accurate. Here are a few corrections and clarifications to enhance clarity and precision:

1. Forking the DID Document: The term "forking" might be a bit misleading in this context. Instead, you might say "updating" or "modifying" the DID Document. Forking typically refers to creating a divergent path in a version-controlled environment, whereas updating a DID Document involves changing its contents, such as public keys.

2. Public Key Changes: You correctly identify the risk of changing public keys in a DID Document. This can indeed lead to issues if not properly tracked, as it might allow someone to repudiate previous actions.

3. Public, Tamper-Resistant Storage: Your mention of DID methods like DID:indy using blockchain for transparent history is accurate. This approach provides a verifiable record of changes, enhancing trust.

4. DID:keri Approach: Your description of DID:keri using a network of watchers is correct. These watchers help ensure the consistency of the DID Document's history by observing and signing records of changes.

5. Hashing DID Document Content: The explanation of using a hash of the DID Document content on a public ledger is accurate. This method provides a tamper-evident seal, ensuring that any changes to the document can be detected.

6. External Observability: You correctly emphasize the importance of independent verification to maintain trust in decentralized identity systems. This external observability is crucial for detecting unauthorized changes and ensuring accountability.

Overall, your explanation captures the key aspects of detecting DID document duplicity and the methods used to address this risk. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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The flow of verifying a verifiable credential

Prompt Can you explain the flow of verifying a verifiable credential and provide a plantuml sequence diagram as well?

Response

Certainly! Verifying a Verifiable Credential (VC) involves several steps to ensure its authenticity and integrity. Here's a general flow of the verification process:

1. Presentation: The holder of the Verifiable Credential presents it to the verifier. This can be done directly or through a Verifiable Presentation, which may include multiple credentials.

2. Credential Structure Check: The verifier checks the structure of the credential to ensure it conforms to the expected format, such as the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model.

3. Signature Verification: The verifier checks the digital signature on the credential to ensure it was issued by a trusted issuer. This involves:

• Retrieving the issuer's public key, often from a Decentralized Identifier (DID) Document.
• Using the public key to verify the signature on the credential.

4. Revocation Status Check: The verifier checks whether the credential has been revoked. This can be done by consulting a revocation registry or checking a status list provided by the issuer.

5. Credential Expiry Check: The verifier checks the expiration date of the credential to ensure it is still valid.

6. Claims Verification: The verifier checks the claims within the credential to ensure they meet the required criteria for the specific use case.

Here's a PlantUML sequence diagram illustrating this flow:

This diagram provides a high-level overview of the verification process, highlighting the interactions between the holder, verifier, issuer, and revocation registry. If you have any more questions or need further details, feel free to ask!

 
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Associating real world identities to DIDs

Prompt Can you help me understand how to associate real world identities to DIDs? Please explain the process to find out if a document was really signed by the author? Please add a plantuml sequence diagram too.

Response

Certainly! Associating real-world identities with Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and verifying document signatures involves several steps to ensure authenticity and trust. Here's a general process:

Associating Real-World Identities with DIDs

1. Issuance of Verifiable Credentials (VCs): A trusted authority issues a Verifiable Credential to an individual, linking their real-world identity to a DID. This credential contains claims about the individual, such as their name, role, or qualifications.

2. DID Document: The DID Document associated with the DID contains public keys and service endpoints. This document is used to verify signatures and establish trust.

3. Verification of Credentials: When someone needs to verify the real-world identity associated with a DID, they can request the Verifiable Credential from the individual. The credential is then verified for authenticity and integrity.

Verifying Document Signatures

1. Signature Creation: The author signs the document using their private key. The signature is a cryptographic proof that the document was signed by the holder of the corresponding private key.

2. Signature Verification: To verify the signature, the verifier retrieves the author's public key from the DID Document associated with the author's DID.

3. Verification Process:

• The verifier uses the public key to verify the digital signature on the document.
• If the signature is valid, it confirms that the document was signed by the holder of the private key associated with the public key.

Here's a PlantUML sequence diagram illustrating the process of verifying a document's signature:

This diagram shows the interactions between the author, verifier, DID Document, and trusted authority, highlighting the steps involved in associating real-world identities with DIDs and verifying document signatures. If you have any more questions or need further details, feel free to ask!

 
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Verifiable Identities

Promtp

What's the difference between Verifiable Identities and DIDs?

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! The concepts of Verifiable Identities and Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are related but distinct in the context of digital identity systems. Here's a breakdown of the differences:

Verifiable Identities

• Definition: Verifiable Identities refer to digital representations of an entity's identity that can be verified for authenticity and integrity. They are often established through Verifiable Credentials (VCs), which are cryptographically signed digital statements about an entity.

• Components: A Verifiable Identity typically includes claims about an entity, such as name, age, or qualifications, and is backed by cryptographic proofs that can be verified by third parties.

• Purpose: The main goal of Verifiable Identities is to provide a trustworthy way to assert and verify identity-related claims in digital interactions, ensuring that the information is accurate and has not been tampered with.

• Use Cases: Verifiable Identities are used in scenarios where trust and verification of identity claims are crucial, such as online authentication, access control, and digital transactions.

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)

• Definition: DIDs are a type of identifier that is designed to be decentralized, persistent, and self-sovereign. They are used to uniquely identify an entity without relying on a centralized authority.

• Components: A DID is associated with a DID Document, which contains public keys, service endpoints, and other metadata necessary for interacting with the entity identified by the DID.

• Purpose: The primary purpose of DIDs is to provide a decentralized and interoperable way to identify entities across different systems and platforms, enabling self-sovereign identity management.

• Use Cases: DIDs are used in decentralized identity systems, where they serve as the foundational layer for establishing trust and enabling secure interactions without centralized control.

Key Differences

• Scope: Verifiable Identities encompass the broader concept of identity verification, including the use of Verifiable Credentials, while DIDs specifically focus on providing a decentralized identifier for entities.

• Functionality: Verifiable Identities are about verifying claims and attributes, whereas DIDs are about providing a unique and persistent identifier that can be resolved to obtain necessary information for interactions.

• Interdependence: DIDs can be a component of Verifiable Identities, as they provide the mechanism for identifying the entity to which the Verifiable Credentials pertain.

Both Verifiable Identities and DIDs play crucial roles in the emerging landscape of decentralized identity, each addressing different aspects of identity management and verification. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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What does DIDcomm solve? (Carly’s notes)

Promtp

Can you help elaborate on what does DIDcomm solve? (Carly’s notes) DID to DID communication Used typically for exchanging verifiable credentials VC binds statements (e.g. licensed to drive) is bound to an ID (the DID). If you are sent a VC - is the person sending you the VC also in control of the DID that the VC represents? For example - could I get a copy of my mother’s VC, and present it to prove I am old enough and buy alcohol online. A DIDcomm message addresses this risk - that the sender of the VC is not actually the person the VC is referencing - It goes in both directions - if you are being asked by your companies financial officer to provide information, you would want to verify that the person making (via presenting their DID), also controls the DID and knows the private keys associated with it. Someone impersonating your companies financial officer wouldn’t know the private keys, and while they might claim to be the financial officer, they can’t prove it, and DID comm is the message protocol that enables all these proofs and discoveries. Point to point - JSON message, which is built upon with credential presentation proof etc. All these functional layers are built in together. "Let’s talk about DIDComm — short for Decentralized Identifier Communication. It’s a protocol that lets digital identities, or DIDs, exchange messages securely and privately. Now, why does that matter? Well, imagine someone sends you a verifiable credential — like proof they’re licensed to drive. That credential is tied to a DID. But here’s the catch: how do you know the person sending it actually controls that DID? Could I just grab my mom’s digital license and use it to buy alcohol online? Technically, I could send the credential — but I can’t prove I control her DID. That’s where DIDComm comes in. DIDComm messages are cryptographically signed, meaning the sender must prove they hold the private keys for the DID they claim to represent. No keys, no trust. And it works both ways. Say your company’s financial officer messages you asking for sensitive data. With DIDComm, you can verify that the message really came from them — not just someone pretending to be them. Under the hood, it’s all built on JSON messages — simple, structured data — but layered with powerful features like authentication, encryption, and proof presentation. So where is DIDComm actually used? You’ll find it in digital identity wallets like Trinsic, Lissi, and Connect.Me — apps that let you receive and present credentials securely. It’s also used in government pilots for digital driver’s licenses, healthcare systems for verifying medical credentials, and financial services for secure, verifiable communication between institutions. It’s even being adopted in enterprise tools built on frameworks like Hyperledger Aries and Veramo, which help developers build secure, interoperable identity agents. So in short: DIDComm isn’t just messaging. It’s trust over the wire — enabling secure, point-to-point communication between digital identities, with verifiable control at every step."

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your notes on DIDComm provide a comprehensive overview of its purpose and functionality. Here’s an elaboration on what DIDComm solves and how it operates:

What DIDComm Solves

1. Secure and Private Communication: DIDComm enables secure, private, and direct communication between Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs). It ensures that messages are exchanged in a way that preserves privacy and confidentiality.

2. Verification of Control: One of the key challenges in digital identity is verifying that the person presenting a Verifiable Credential (VC) actually controls the DID associated with it. DIDComm addresses this by requiring cryptographic proofs that the sender holds the private keys for the DID they claim to represent. This prevents scenarios where someone might misuse another person's credentials, like using a parent's digital license to buy alcohol online.

3. Mutual Authentication: DIDComm facilitates mutual authentication, ensuring that both parties in a communication can verify each other's identities. This is crucial in scenarios where sensitive information is exchanged, such as between a company's financial officer and an employee.

4. Point-to-Point Communication: DIDComm supports direct, point-to-point communication using JSON messages. These messages are layered with features like authentication, encryption, and proof presentation, making them robust and secure.

5. Interoperability and Flexibility: DIDComm is designed to be interoperable across different platforms and applications. It is used in digital identity wallets, government pilots, healthcare systems, and financial services, among others. This flexibility makes it a versatile protocol for various use cases.

How DIDComm Works

• Message Structure: DIDComm messages are structured as JSON, which is a simple and widely-used data format. This structure is enhanced with cryptographic features to ensure security and trust.

• Cryptographic Signing: Messages are cryptographically signed, meaning the sender must use their private key to sign the message. The recipient can then verify the signature using the sender's public key, ensuring the message's authenticity.

• Encryption: Messages can be encrypted to ensure that only the intended recipient can read them. This adds a layer of confidentiality to the communication.

• Proof Presentation: DIDComm supports the presentation of proofs, such as those required to verify control over a DID or the validity of a credential.

Use Cases

• Digital Identity Wallets: Applications like Trinsic, Lissi, and Connect.Me use DIDComm to securely receive and present credentials.

• Government and Healthcare: DIDComm is used in pilots for digital driver’s licenses and in healthcare systems for verifying medical credentials.

• Financial Services: It facilitates secure communication between financial institutions, ensuring that sensitive data is exchanged safely.

• Enterprise Tools: Frameworks like Hyperledger Aries and Veramo incorporate DIDComm to help developers build secure, interoperable identity solutions.

In summary, DIDComm is a powerful protocol that enables secure, verifiable communication between digital identities, ensuring trust and authenticity at every step. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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Why do we need the trust spanning protocol (general) (Carly’s notes)

Promtp

Can you help elaborate on why do we need the trust spanning protocol (general) (Carly’s notes) When you want to communicate online DID comm is one way to exchange information DID to DID with verification and has been typically used for exchanging credentials. TSP is also for DID to DID communication, but it also can use other verifiable identifiers. It only a minimal function where it only handles authentic, secure, private communication between verifiable identifiers. What those identities want to share is independent and not included in the specification which keeps it small with minimal functions. TSP is more general than DIDcomm which has features optimized for VC sharing. TSP also has benefits for being a communication protocol that works over multiple other protocols including bluetooth,

Response

I can see where you’re coming from! Your notes on the Trust Spanning Protocol (TSP) highlight its role and importance in the realm of digital communication. Here’s an elaboration on why TSP is needed and how it functions:

Why We Need the Trust Spanning Protocol (TSP)

1. Generalized Communication: TSP is designed to facilitate secure, authentic, and private communication between verifiable identifiers, not limited to Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs). This makes it a more general protocol compared to DIDComm, which is specifically optimized for exchanging Verifiable Credentials (VCs).

2. Minimal Functionality: TSP focuses on the core aspects of communication—authenticity, security, and privacy—without dictating what information should be shared. This minimalistic approach keeps the protocol lightweight and adaptable to various use cases.

3. Interoperability: TSP is designed to work over multiple transport protocols, including Bluetooth, making it versatile and suitable for a wide range of environments and devices. This interoperability ensures that TSP can be used in diverse scenarios, from IoT devices to traditional internet communications.

4. Flexibility in Identifier Use: While DIDComm is tailored for DID to DID communication, TSP can accommodate other types of verifiable identifiers. This flexibility allows for broader application across different identity systems and use cases.

5. Decoupling of Communication and Content: By focusing solely on the communication layer, TSP allows the content of the communication to be independent of the protocol. This decoupling means that TSP can be used for various types of data exchange without being tied to specific content formats or structures.

6. Foundation for Higher-Layer Protocols: TSP serves as a foundational protocol that can support higher-layer protocols and applications. Its design is inspired by the success of the TCP/IP protocol suite, providing a simple and efficient base for building more complex communication systems.

Key Benefits of TSP

• Security: Ensures that communications are secure and that the identities involved are verifiable.
• Privacy: Protects the privacy of the communication, preventing unauthorized access or eavesdropping.
• Authenticity: Verifies that the communication is genuine and that the parties involved are who they claim to be.
• Versatility: Can be used across different transport mechanisms and with various types of identifiers.

In summary, the Trust Spanning Protocol provides a flexible, secure, and interoperable framework for digital communication, supporting a wide range of identifiers and transport protocols. Its minimalistic design and focus on core communication principles make it a valuable tool in the evolving landscape of digital identity and communication. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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{
  "https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/": {
    "title": "ToIP TSP Specification",
    "date": "2025-05-09",
    "count": 13
  },
  "https://trustrosie.io/dist/docs/public/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf": {
    "title": "Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) Design v2.60",
    "date": "2019-07-03",
    "context": "Whitepaper",
    "group": "KERI",
    "subGroup": "",
    "count": 2
  }
}

DIGITAL TRUST

Can you please define Digital Trust? If you don't have a source for your answer then please let me know.

Response

I don’t know the exact definition of Digital Trust from a specific source, but I can provide a general understanding based on common principles in the field.

Digital Trust

Digital Trust refers to the confidence that users, organizations, and systems have in the security, privacy, and integrity of digital interactions and transactions. It encompasses the assurance that digital identities, data, and communications are authentic, reliable, and protected from unauthorized access or tampering. Digital Trust is foundational for enabling secure online interactions, fostering user confidence, and supporting the growth of digital ecosystems.

Key Components of Digital Trust

1. Security: Ensuring that digital systems and data are protected against unauthorized access, breaches, and cyber threats.

2. Privacy: Safeguarding personal and sensitive information, ensuring that it is collected, used, and shared in compliance with privacy regulations and user expectations.

3. Integrity: Maintaining the accuracy and consistency of data and digital communications, ensuring that they are not altered or tampered with.

4. Authentication: Verifying the identities of users and systems involved in digital interactions, ensuring that they are who they claim to be.

5. Transparency: Providing clear and accessible information about how digital systems operate, how data is used, and how trust is established and maintained.

6. Accountability: Ensuring that entities involved in digital interactions are responsible for their actions and that there are mechanisms in place to address breaches of trust.

Digital Trust is essential for building confidence in digital technologies and services, enabling secure and seamless interactions in an increasingly connected world. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, feel free to ask!

 
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  "https://trustrosie.io/dist/docs/public/Trainable_MeDDEa_Distributed_Governance_-_a_Principal-Agent_Approach_to_Data_Governance_--_Part_1_Background_&_Core_Definitions_15Aug2023.txt": {
    "title": "Distributed Governance: a Principal-Agent approach to data governance. Part 1 background & core definitions (Trainable Version)",
    "date": "2023-08-15",
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  "https://hasgeek.com/PrivacyMode/data-gov-and-sem/sub/human-colossus-foundation-dynamic-data-economy-PEgpnGoZ97FSGQoFPsj9da": {
    "title": "Human Colossus Foundation: Dynamic Data Economy – Data Governance and semantics",
    "date": "2022-08-16",
    "context": "Post",
    "group": "HCF",
    "subGroup": "",
    "count": 3
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  "https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/1.3/explainer/Explainer.html": {
    "title": "C2PA Explainer :: C2PA Specifications",
    "date": "2024-10-28",
    "context": "C2PA",
    "group": "WIP",
    "subGroup": "Prospects",
    "tags": [
      "C2PA"
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    "count": 1
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  "https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/1.2/guidance/Guidance.html": {
    "title": "C2PA Implementation Guidance :: C2PA Specifications",
    "date": "2024-10-28",
    "context": "C2PA",
    "group": "WIP",
    "subGroup": "Prospects",
    "tags": [
      "C2PA"
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    "count": 1
  },
  "https://trustrosie.io/dist/docs/public/UN_DPI_2024-04_Leveraging_DPI_for_safe_and_Inclusive_Societies.pdf": {
    "title": "Leveraging Digital Public Infrastructure for Safe and Inclusive Societies, Interim Report, April 2024",
    "date": "2024-04-01",
    "context": "Governance",
    "group": "Frameworks",
    "subGroup": "",
    "count": 1
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  "https://trustrosie.io/dist/docs/public/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf": {
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    "context": "Whitepaper",
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